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what measures are useful to collect. 
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Performance management in government has received increasing  interest since the 
late 1980s, fostered by the ‘re-inventing government’ movement (Osbourne and 
Gaebler 1992).  The American Government and Performance Results Act of 1993 
required all federal departments and agencies to develop 5 year strategic plans linked 
to measurable outcomes, via a series of annual performance plans from 1999 onwards.  
These performance plans had to cover each programme activity set forth in the agency 
budget, with specific performance measures, and objective, quantifiable and 
measurable goals (Kravchuk and Schack 1996).  The Job Training and Partnership 
Act of 1982 (JTPA) was the first large scale, federally funded programme to mandate 
the use of performance measures in state and local programmes.  They have since 
been introduced in welfare to work programmes, child welfare agencies, child support 
enforcement programmes, and other programmes partly or wholly funded by the 
government.  Under many of these programmes agencies are required not only to 
publish performance measures but to l ink payments to them.  The Job Training 
Partnership Act is one well studied example, another is the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families Programme, under which states have competed for large bonuses 
based on their success in meeting employment and teenage birth reduction goals 
(Heinrich 1999). 
 
In the UK, the Financial Management Initiative, introduced in the early 1980s, 
embodied performance management but was assessed as being unsuccessful in 
influencing the allocation of public sector resources or increasing the degree of public 
accountability (Osbourne et al 1995; Sharifi and Bovaird 1995).  While some 
performance measures were part of the Conservative adminstration’s management of 
the public sector, there has been a large rise in their use following the election of the 
Labour administration in 1997.  Performance targets, their publication and the linking 
of such targets to the resources allocated by Treasury to government departments is 
now widespread in the UK public sector.  In addition, individual providers of public 
services now may get specific rewards linked to their performance with respect to 
such targets.  Some of these rewards are non-monetary, for example hospitals that 
reach certain thresholds of performance are to get ‘earned autonomy’.  S ome 
indirectly reward good performance, for example schools that perform well get more 
pupils.  Finally, some are direct financial rewards for performance, for example the 
team based bonuses being piloted in Customs and Excise and Job Centre Plus 
(Makinson 2000). 
 
Much has been written in theory about performance measures.  However, less is 
known in practice about their operation, particularly in the public sector.  In addition, 
even fewer studies have examined whether performance measures actually achieve 
the aims of the programme or government agency, although this is ideally the 
question that should be asked: do performance measures help agencies achieve the 
goals they have been set by policy makers?  Given the lack of evidence on this topic, 
the focus of this review is somewhat broader.  We begin with a discussion of the key 
features of public services that affect the use and usefulness of performance measures 
in the public sector.  We then provide a description of what performance measures are 
and the different ways they may be used.  We review the evidence on the use of 
performance measures in three key public service areas: education and job training, 
health and education.  The evidence in the first area comes almost entirely from the 2 
USA.  We examine this evidence as the large number of studies of performance 
management in this area means that researchers have come closest to asking and 
answering the question of whether performance management improves performance.  
The other two areas have been selected because performance management is 
important and growing in both sectors in the UK.  For these two sectors we review 
both UK and American evidence.  This is both because these countries are seen as 
leaders in the use of performance management in the public sector, and because, as a 
consequence, the literature in this field has a predominantly UK and US focus. 
 
 
2. The special features of the public sector 
 
Performance management is used in both the private and public sector.  While many 
of the issues that arise in its use are common to both sectors, researchers studying the 
behaviour of public sector organisations have recently drawn attention to the fact that 
the public sector is different from the private sector and therefore a public sector 
organisation faced with a change in incentives will not necessarily behave in the same 
way as a private sector one
1. 
 
Dixit (2002) stresses two important features of the public sector.  The first is that 
bureaucrats often serve several masters: these may include the users of the service, 
payers for the service, politicians at different levels of government, professional 
organisations.  The second, a consequence of the first, is that the agency and so the 
bureaucrats who work in it often have several ends to achieve.  For example, they are 
often expected to increase both efficiency and equity in the delivery of public 
services.  These features are termed multiple principals and multiple tasks (or goals) 
respectively.  These two characteristics mean that the incentives provided in the 
public sector should be less high powered than for the private sector. 
 
Even if we consider just one principal, there may be divergence from the predictions 
of standard agency theory in the public sector context.  First, as Dixit points out, the 
standard agency problem assumes a risk neutral principal.  However, at least one 
group of public sector principals – elected politicians – cannot ‘diversify’ the effects 
of bad outcomes.  This may make them very risk averse, which again means that the 
results from the standard theory will not apply.  A second diversion from standard 
theory concerns the issue of moral hazard on the principal’s side.  For example, an 
individual may decide to make her career within the public sector, and make career-
specific investments to do so, only to find that her pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary 
benefits are worse than expected.  Hence, ex post, her participation constraint may not 
be met. 
 
So the multiplicity of goals and principals implies that the provision of high-powered 
incentives are less likely to be suitable for the public sector than in the private sector 
where individuals may have to perform fewer, better defined, tasks.  And, precisely 
because this is the case, the type of individuals found in the public sector may be more 
risk averse than those in the private sector.  High-powered incentives may also not be 
necessary if it is the case that public sector workers are more motivated than those in 
the private sector by non-pecuniary benefits and other career concerns.  (For more 
                                                 
1 As an example, see Wilson’s (1989) influential case study of US bureaucracy. 3 
discussion of incentives, see the articles in this volume by Burgess and Ratto and by 
Besley and Ghatak). 
 
The features of multiple principals and multiple tasks mean that the goals of a public 
agency may be in conflict.  Consequently the performance measures used to evaluate 
often complex public sector performance may also be in conflict.  The multiple and 
sometimes vague goals of the public sector mean that performance relative to these 
goals is difficult to measure.  Individuals will respond to performance measures (PMs) 
in ways that maximise their own utility or benefit.  This is not necessarily consistent 
with PMs improving welfare, nor is it necessarily in ways that are expected by those 
that design the system.  The literature has many examples of both distorted measures 
and altered behaviour to improve the PM at the expense of unmeasured actions.  
Regular (usually annual) summary, outcome-based PMs can be altered, and they can 
change behaviour, possibly in dysfunctional ways.  Examples abound in the public 
sector: they include massaging of truancy rates in UK education (Fitz-Gibbon 1996), 
massaging of waiting lists and treated cases in UK healthcare (see Smith 1995), 
unnecessary changes in the timing of graduation of workfare enrolees from schemes 
in the US (Courty and Marschke 1997).  In economic terms, these measures can be 
(and are) ‘gamed’.  Gaming can take many forms.  Smith (1995) has given a list of 
unintended consequences of publishing PMs in the public sector.  These include 
tunnel vision; myopia; measure fixation; sub-optimisation; gaming; misrepresentation 
and misinterpretation
2.  While these are different forms of behaviour, all are due to the 
fact that the agent has different aims from the principal(s).  As the principal tries to 
get higher effort (and so better public services) by implementing performance 
measurement, the response may be better services but also may be other less desired 
behaviour. 
 
Finally, from a rather different perspective, Le Grand (1997) argues that the view of 
the motivations of those providing, funding and receiving welfare from the UK 
welfare state has changed.  From its inception in the late 1940s to the mid-1970s 
providers and funders of welfare services were seen as ‘knights’, eschewing self-
interest to achieve the collective good.  The users of the service, in contrast, were seen 
as passive ‘pawns’ prepared to take what they were given without complaint.  This 
view then changed to one where in which all parties were viewed as pursuing their 
own self-interests: in Le Grand’s terms, they behaved as ‘knaves’.  Le Grand points 
out that in fact it is likely that individuals have a mixture of motivations and that 
design of the welfare state is better when it allows for this mixture of motivation.  He 
also points out that the design of incentives may make individuals change their 
motivations.  For example, he argues that giving high-powered financial rewards to 
doctors may turn them from knights to knaves, or at least increase the amount of 
knavish behaviour.  In the context of performance management, this perspective 
emphasises the endogeneity of provider motivation to the type of performance 
management scheme.  In other words, not only may individuals ‘game’ the system but 
the introduction of different methods o f measuring performance and rewarding 




                                                 
2 Goddard, Mannion and Smith (2000) show how these can be derived from a principal-agent model. 4 
3. What is performance management? 
Rationale for a performance management system 
 
Performance management may be undertaken at various levels of government and its 
purpose may differ depending on the level at which is it implemented. For example, it 
can be used to improve the performance of individual units  (such as particular 
schools, hospitals, police forces). This may or may not be linked to ‘best practice’ 
exercises, in which the best performing units are used as an example for others to 
follow. It can be used as part of an attempt to improve the performance of the overall 
organisation. In this case the focus of the exercise is to improve the performance of 
the parent organisation as a whole, as well as possibly providing some developmental 
information for a single unit. For example, performance measurement may improve 
the overall performance of the education system even if it does not give many clues of 
itself to the problems within any one school.  It may be used as part of the attempt to 
foster or generate pseudo-competition, for example, where purchasers in health care 
buy care from providers on the basis of measures of performance. It may also be used 
to improve accountability in the public sector (for example, to highlight ‘failing 
schools’).  It can be used as part of a resource allocation system, for example to 
enable central government to allocate funds to service providers such a s local 
government agencies.  In the use made of performance management in the UK public 
sector we can see elements of all these aims, but they are often not clearly separately 
identified and the same tools may be used for different purposes. 
 
There are various possible ways in which performance measures may be used 
(Burgess et al 2002).  The PM information may be kept internal to the organisation 
and not published.  In this case it is a management tool.  Alternatively, the PM may be 
made public.  In this case it may be linked to an incentive scheme.  If so, the scheme 
may be explicit or implicit.  In an explicit scheme a direct financial reward is made 
available to either the individual, a subgroup of the organisation (if one can be 
defined) or the whole organisation.  This is basically pay for performance at the 
organisational or sub-organisational level.  The Public Service Agreements used by 
Treasury to give resources to government departments is an example of such a 
scheme.  Under an implicit scheme, the organisation (and not the individual) gets a 
financial reward as a result of the response of others to the PM.  A classic example of 
this is a quasi-market, in which providers of services are rewarded for good 
performance by getting more contracts.  Even where there is no incentive scheme, 
explicit or implicit, publication of PMs may still have an effect on behaviour, for 
example through individuals’ pride in their ‘league position’, or avoiding a label of 
being a ‘failing’ organisation.  This is the idea behind ‘name and shame’ policies 
applied to schools.  Conversely, there may be rewards to agents who perform well.  
These may be pecuniary or non-pecuniary.  The published school league tables 
provide two types of non-pecuniary benefit to teachers, for example: a short run 
‘prestige’ benefit as well as a longer run ‘working conditions’ benefit if good pupils 
are able to choose schools with a high league table position and if teachers prefer 
teaching good students
3.  In all these cases performance management is intended to 
                                                 
3 Precisely how such mechanisms operate will depend on how capitation payments are calculated and 
on whether parents can effectively exercise school choice, on whether schools are capacity constrained, 
on whether they can select pupils, and so on.  Here there is a trade-off between the efficiency properties 5 
provide competitive pressure on organisations to improve, but the precise way in 
which it brings about better results differs. 
 
To date, it is more common for PMs in the UK public sector to be linked to an 
implicit incentive scheme; one given in the form of client/service user/customer 
choice.  The PMs then empower the client to make an informed choice.  Such 
schemes were introduced in the UK as part of the quasi-market reforms in health, 
community care, housing and education.  In all cases provider organisations were to 
get contracts on the basis of their performance.  Initially, there were few measures of 
performance, but over time their number has increased.  We review the PMs currently 
employed in health and education below. 
 
Types of performance measure used 
 
Performance measures come in a variety of forms.  At one end of the spectrum, there 
are measures derived from an in-depth evaluation of an organisation’s processes and 
outcomes, typically involving a site-visit and large amounts of documentation.  UK 
examples are OFSTED visits of schools, police inspections, QAA of teaching in 
universities, HMI Prison reports.  At the other end are measures that are derived from 
administrative data and comprise the collection and publication of summary 
performance measures.  UK examples are the truancy and limited measures of 
national exam pass rates published for UK schools.  In between there are measures 
based on the collection of detailed data collected specifically for the purpose of 
performance management, for example, so called ‘report card’ data that is collected 
on the quality of health care in the US.  Report card data typically involves specific 
surveys of several aspects of the medical care of patients undergoing a treatment for a 
particular medical condition.  The focus of this paper is primarily on the use of less 
detailed measures based on routine administrative data.  In passing it should be noted 
that the more detailed measures are more expensive to collect, so if it can be shown 
that the summary measures provide as good a measure as more detailed ones, there is 
then a case for moving to such measures.  Recent work in health in the US (Dranove 
et al 2002) shows that some summary measures may be as good as much more 
detailed expensive measures for one particular treatment (Acute Myocardial 
Infarction).  There has been no comparable research in the UK. 
 
It will seldom be possible – or optimal – for there to be one (scalar) performance 
measure.  Both the designers of the performance management system and final users 
care about vectors of outcomes, but the weights these two principals attach to these 
outcomes may differ.  This raises the question of whether (i) the designer’s vector of 
outcomes should be aggregated in a way which reflects her marginal rate of 
substitution between the component outcomes or (ii) component scores should be 
made available so final users can apply their own weights based on their marginal 
rates of substitution.  If a resource allocation mechanism is attached, then a scalar 
measure is required.  If, however, users’ preferences differ, then (ii) is better
4.  
                                                                                                                                            
of the capitation system and how highly geared the system is in providing incentives.  We are grateful 
to an anonymous referee for this point. 
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point. 6 
Moreover, while multi-dimensional PMs are harder to interpret, they are also more 
difficult to game. 
 
Over time, there has been change in the form of PMs used in the UK public sector.  In 
a review of the use of PMs across the public sector in the UK, Mannion and Goddard 
(2000) conclude that, across all the sectors they surveyed, there have been clear shifts 
in what data have been collected.  These shifts are: from collection of data on a 
narrow range of dimensions of performance towards development of indicator 
packages which reflect a broader assessment of organisational activity; from 
gratuitous collection of performance data towards the development of more 
streamlined and focused indicator packages; and some development of cross-sector or 
interface indicators where it has been recognised that organisational performance is 
partly reliant on the actions of other agencies. 
 
There has also been change in how PMs are used.  Mannion and Goddard (2000) find 
there has been a general shift in the use of information on performance away from 
primarily being used for internal management control purposes towards use of these 
data for external accountability and control.  Performance data has been increasingly 
used to mediate contractual relations.  There has been a shift away from informal 
performance assessments based on peer review or sample-based inspection towards 
increased reliance on published performance league tables based on administrative 
data.  More broadly, there has been a shift towards the use of performance 
information to facilitate participatory form of democracy and active citizenship.  
Finally, the current UK Labour administration has moved towards linking 
performance measures to financial rewards.  Examples are the team based incentives 
schemes piloted in several government departments (Makinson 2000), or the greater 
access to capital investment and greater freedom from central management given to 
hospitals which perform well against a set of financial and other targets (Department 
of Health 2002). 
 
Barnow (1992) identifies a range of performance measures which are used in 
government programmes.  These measures do not necessarily correspond to any 
single economic concept and a programme may use more than one performance 




Gross outcomes are measures of outcomes of the programme at some designated date.  
Training programme gross outcomes include job placements, wages, exit from 
welfare.  Health programme gross outcomes include the number of individuals who 
do not die after emergency admissions for heart attacks, or the number of individuals 
given hip replacements.  Education gross outcomes include the number of pupils 
passing exams at a certain grade.  The advantage of such measures are that they are 
easy to understand and easy to collect.  These outcomes are gross in the sense that 
they do not necessarily measure the actual output of the programme itself.  For 
example, pupils may have passed exams in the absence of school inputs, patients may 
have recovered from heart attacks without medical intervention.  However, if gross 
outcomes are measured relative to some standard which is set to take account of what 
would have happened without the programme, then the gross outcomes may be useful 
in assessing the impact of the programme.  Gross outcomes also do not take into 7 
account the difficulty of treating a particular individual, but they can be adjusted for 
observed characteristics of the individual and this can partially overcome this 
problem.  In fact, in many situations, heterogeneity across programme users means 
that such adjustments will be necessary. For example, performance measures for 
medical outcomes in the US are frequently risk adjusted (essentially adjusted for the 
health of the individuals treated).  Under the JTPA programme, gross outcomes 





These are measures of the value added of the programme
5.  In the JTPA context, value 
added can be thought of as the human capital added to the participants.  As Barnow 
(1992) points out, barriers to developing net output measures may be high, primarily 
because the output of the programme may be multi-dimensional: for example, outputs 
from JTPA comprise a range of both general academic training and basic work skills.  
One way of overcoming this is to calculate the value of net outputs – the net earnings 
gain from participation – so there is a common metric across outcomes, but again this 
is not a simple matter.  More generally, measuring value added is fraught with 
methodological problems, a key one being the difficulty of constructing a 
counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of the programme.  This 
means that net output calculations often require evaluations that are expensive and 
cannot be done on a regular basis.  In addition, collecting such data takes time, so net 
measures do not give those who run the programme information when they need it, 
typically at the end of the year.  In some sectors, e.g. education, net measures may be 
easier to collect.  We discuss the use of value added measures of school performance 
later in this paper. 
 
Inputs and processes measures 
 
Examples of such measures include enrolees to programmes, number of staff, number 
waiting for treatment, teacher-pupil ratios.  Whilst widely used, they provide no 
information on the effectiveness of the programmes.  Using costs as a performance 
measure also biases activity towards shorter and less intensive programmes. 
 
 
4. Assessing the performance of performance measures 
 
Assessment of the impact of performance management is hampered by the lack of 
experimentation in, and associated assessment of, government policy.  Performance 
measures have been introduced, generally not in a controlled trial manner, but as a 
result of a policy change.  Experiments may be viewed as unethical or too expensive. 
Often performance assessment is accompanied by changes in other incentives.  For 
example, the UK school league tables were introduced across all schools, and as part 
of the general reform of schooling provision.  This makes it difficult to isolate the 
impact of introduction of performance management from other policy changes that are 
implemented at the same time.  The long and short term impact of performance 
                                                 
5 Note that value added here is not measured net of the cost of the programme.  We return to this below 
in the context of value added PMs in education. 8 
management may diverge, but the short term goals of politicians means that they not 
generally be interested in spending money undertaking evaluations which will only be 
known years after the implementation of a policy change. 
 
The lessons from JTPA programme 
 
The US Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) provides one of the few instances in 
which an assessment of the impact of performance measures can be made.  The JTPA 
introduced, in the early 1980s, a performance management system that was distinct in 
its focus on programme outcomes (e.g. job placements and trainee earnings) rather 
than outputs (e.g. persons trained), the use of budgetary incentives for managers based 
on outcomes, and the linking of performance measures across federal state and local 
government (Heinrich 2003).  In addition, data was collected on the long-term 
earnings and labour market participation of enrolees to the programme. This has 
meant that the JTPA can be used to analyse the effectiveness of performance 
management systems based on outcomes. 
 
The JTPA performance standards system mandates the provision of employment and 
training opportunities to “those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, such 
opportunities” (Heckman, Heinrich and Smith 1997 page 390).  Basic performance 
standards are defined in terms of trainee employment, wage rates and earnings levels 
after the trainees leave the programme (at the time of most of the evaluations that 
have been undertaken of JTPA this was defined as the date at which the trainee was 
terminated from the programme).  States implemented a variety of incentive schemes 
to reward good performance relative to the standards.  Performance based incentives 
awards could only be spent to augment the budget of the training centres. 
 
Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (1997, 2002) use JTPA data to examine the 
effectiveness of these performance measures (PMs).  They ask three specific 
questions: first, do bureaucrats respond to incentives and are they equally effective for 
case workers and managers; second, do incentives point bureaucrats in the ‘right 
direction’; and third, how much wasteful activity is induced by bureaucrats attempting 
to ‘game’ the standards? 
 
They note first that the potential for conflict between efficiency and equity is written 
into the law authorising the programme.  Second, PMs are written in terms of levels 
and not unobserved gains net of cost, the proper definition of efficiency.  Third, PMs 
are, typically, short- rather than long-term measures.  The use of these short-term 
outcomes creates the possibility that PMs misdirect activity by focusing training 
centre attention on criteria that may be perversely related to long term net benefits, 
long run equity criteria, or both.  This is especially likely in a human capital 
programme, as one benefit of such a programme is that it encourages further 
education and training.  Such additional investment depresses short run earnings but 
increases them in the long run. 
 
The use of employment and earnings levels also gives rise to potential gains from 
cream-skimming.  Training centres may select persons with high expected levels of 
target outcomes rather than those who would gain most from participation (have high 9 
potential value added).  Heckman et al (2002) define precisely the concept of cream 
skimming to assess whether it is a serious problem. 
 
Their findings are as follows.  First, they do not find cream-skimming to be such a 
problem
6.  They find instead the natural inclinations of employees – which are to help 
the most disadvantaged – often dominate, except where very performance orientated 
systems are run.  They note even where this is not the case, the performance standards 
operate as a partial check on the preferences of case workers for helping the least 
advantaged (and perhaps those with the least value added ).  Second, they find that the 
long-term value added goals are not met.  Instead, the short-term performance 
measures that are used in their place are either uncorrelated with, or are negatively 
correlated with, long-term value added.  Third, they cite evidence from Courty and 
Marschke (1997) that managers game the system to achieve performance standards.  
Courty and Marschke (2004) find further evidence of such gaming behaviour and 
show that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organisation. 
 
Barnow (2000) also examines how closely the performance management criteria used 
to evaluate JTPA participants in 1 6 JTPA sites corresponds to the impact of the 
programme, where impact is defined from a randomised control study for those 16 
JTPA sites (the National JTPA study).  In undertaking this study he first notes that 
both the goals of JTPA have changed over time (e.g. in response to worries about 
‘cream-skimming’) and the use of sanctions for failure have not always been imposed.  
Under the original design, poor performers, defined as those who failed to meet 
standards two years in a row, would be subject to reorganisation (which was 
essentially equal to loss of jobs).  He notes that governors have been unwilling to do 
this, and instead performance measures have been modified.  His findings echo those 
of Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (1997, 2002).  He concludes that the current 
performance management system does not produce rankings that correspond closely 
to rankings on impact.  For example, for several indicators/target group combinations, 
he finds that on the general criterion for sanctioning – falling in the bottom quarter of 
the performance rankings – a significant percentage of those ranked in the bottom 
quarter were misclassified.  He also notes that there were difficulties in the 
performance management system controlling for local economic conditions. 
 
There is also evidence from the JTPA programme that performance measures can be 
shaped by bureaucratic decisions.  Heinrich (1999) studied one training centre (Cook 
County, Illinois) in which the performance incentives were strongly reinforced by the 
use of performance based contracts for the providers who delivered the services.  
Managers in Cook Country responded to the risk inherent in the reward system by 
passing the risks onto their service providers through the use of performance based 
contracts.  The standards set in these contracts were higher than the ones the centre 
faced in its contracts.  Overall, the strong performance incentives encouraged the 
selection of the more job-ready applicants and the provision of less intensive and less 
expensive training services.  In contrast, in the Corpus Christi site studied by 
Heckman, Smith and Taber (1997) (and argued to be more typical) case workers 
maintained a strong preference for serving the most disadvantaged (and least 
employable). 
                                                 
6 Cream skimming is defined precisely in terms of counterfactuals and is related to an economic model 
of performance standards in Heckman et al (2002). See also Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997). 10 
 
In conclusion, Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (1997) note that it is important not to 
confuse a focused effort with a productive one.  While managers responded to the 
performance management scheme by undertaking effort, and the gross outcomes 
based PMs improved as a result, this did not necessarily help to achieve the specific 
goals of the programme.  Indeed, the goals themselves have evolved over time, 
through the influence of the bureaucrats within the programme. 
 
The lessons from the education sector 
 
The education sector in the UK has been subject to relatively high levels of public 
monitoring since the implementation of the 1988 Education Reform Act.  Since then 
the performance management system has comprised two key elements: OFSTED 
reports and the annual publication of summary performance measures (PMs) in what 
are currently commonly referred to as the league tables.  Here we focus on the latter.  
The aim of the publication of summary PMs is generally considered to be twofold: to 
create the incentive for schools to improve their students’ educational attainment and 
to provide information on individual school performance to inform parental choice.  
The two are linked through the working of the quasi-market. 
 
In the US the policy focus is on “improving the quality of schooling or how much is 
learned each year” for the same resource base (Hanushek 2002 page 2056).  Emphasis 
has recently shifted from measurement of inputs to measurement of outcomes, with 
the publication of this information on report cards which sometimes include school 
rankings with respect to the various indicators.  A variety of explicit and implicit 
incentives at both school and teacher level are incorporated into different states’ 
accountability systems (Kane and Staiger 2002), with some options for exit from 
schools identified as failing.  The use of accountability systems based on student test 
performance was put into law in January 2002 with the signing of the ‘No Child Left 
Behind’ Act (Cullen and Reback 2002). 
 
So what are the outcome measures that try to capture movement towards the goal of 
improving student performance?  Both in the UK and the US, one or more of the 
following are used, and in each case a school mean summary statistic is published 
(Kane and Staiger 2002).  Levels are raw output scores (gross outcomes) of a cohort at 
a specific point in time, often reported as the percentage of that cohort achieving a 
particular target.  In the UK, for example, one key PM is the percentage of a school’s 
pupils who gain at least five GCSE passes at grade C or above.  Changes aim to 
capture the improvement of successive cohorts at the same grade in the same school 
across time; while gains provide a measure of the progress of one cohort between two 
points in time.  The value added measures published in the UK school performance 
tables for the first time in 2002 provide an example of a ‘gain’ PM (Wilson 2003). 
 
The aim of using a value added PM is to better isolate the impact school environment 
has on pupil progress between two points in time.  It does this by incorporating prior 
attainment, which helps to account for factors beyond the school’s control, such as 
family background and other personal characteristics.  In the UK, for example, two 
value added measures were published for each secondary school in the 2002 league 
tables: one provided an indicator of the average value added by the school between 11 
the ages of 11 and 14 (Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 3) and the other between 14 and 16 
(Key Stage 3 and GCSE – the latter being exams which mark the end of compulsory 
schooling)
7.  Details on how the latter UK value added PM is calculated are given in 
Wilson (2003).  One point to note is that the UK value added PM takes no account of 
the resources used by a school.  Similar to the net output PMs discussed by Barnow 
(1992), it therefore does not provide a measure of school effectiveness or efficiency, 
but rather a measure of total school performance, including teacher effects, resource 
levels and peer group (Meyer 1997).  As such it may be suited more to the issue of 
parental choice rather than the government’s aim of raising standards for the same 
resource base.  A key point here is that a PM to reward schools should be measured 
net of peer effects, but a parent choosing a school should look at a value added PM 
which does not correct for them
8. 
 
Koretz (2002) identifies three issues about inferring educators’ performance from that 
of their students: (i) the limitations of measures employed; (ii) the perverse incentives 
that may be created; (iii) the difficulties in drawing inferences regarding the gains in 
student performance.  Each type of PM raises distinct points with regard to these three 
issues; here we concentrate on levels and gains and draw on evidence from both the 
UK and the US. 
 
Limitations of measures employed 
 
The production of education is a complex process, so any one PM will at best be an 
imperfect measure of the multiple tasks undertaken by a school; indeed, some of these 
tasks may be inherently unmeasurable (Dixit 2002).  Tests are inevitably incomplete 
samples of a chievement domains (Koretz 2002) and hence may be subject to 
measurement error (Ladd and Walsh 2002).  Kane and Staiger (2002) compare the 
statistical properties of the three types of PM.  They show that PMs comprising raw 
output scores are subject to bias because they do not take account of factors outside a 
school’s control
9.  While such levels-based PMs are the most reliable, much of this 
reliability is due to the unchanging characteristics of each school’s population, rather 
than persistence in educational practices within the school.  Incorporating prior 
attainment, i.e. using a value added PM, helps reduce the bias but at the cost of a 
reduction in reliability since the inclusion of prior attainment partially accounts for 
individual pupil characteristics.  This leads to these PMs exhibiting a high degree of 
volatility year on year, which in turn reduces their predictive power.  One solution 
may be to pool test score data over time: the NCLB Act gives states the option of 
using a three-year weighted average (Kane and Staiger 2002). 
 
PMs based on raw test results provide a picture of the achievement of a group of 
pupils at a particular grade or level.  But education is a cumulative process, building 
on a series of inputs over time (Hanushek 2002).  Here again, value added represents 
an improvement on levels as it incorporates prior attainment and hence accounts for 
the impact of those inputs up to that point. 
 
                                                 
7 The 2003 secondary school league tables will include a measure of ‘whole school’ value added, i.e. 
between the ages of 11 and 16. 
8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.  See Hanushek (2002) for discussion of peer 
group effects. 
9 Goldstein (2003) discusses this point in relation to PMs that show changes across time. 12 
While representing an improvement on levels based PMs, there are limitations to the 
value added PMs currently employed.  Goldstein (2003) highlights three problems 
with regard to those published in the 2002 UK secondary school league tables.  First, 
the input score used as the basis for the value added calculation is not sufficiently 
accurate: there is evidence that adjustment should be made for performance earlier in 
the child’s school history.  Second, the sometimes large uncertainty or confidence 
intervals for the resultant PMs should be emphasised, particularly for small school 
cohorts.  These provide information on which schools are statistically different from 
the average and hence give context to the (in)accuracy of any subsequent rankings 
exercise.  This is also an issue for levels based PMs (see also Kane and Staiger (2002) 
on this point with regard to US data).  Third is the problem of mobility: students who 
are mobile tend to have different rates of progress and may be over-represented in 
certain schools; current value added PMs take no account of this. 
 
Perverse incentives created 
 
The possibility that the publication of summary performance measures may cause 
agencies to exhibit dysfunctional behaviour has been well documented following 
Smith (1995).  Here we highlight three manifestations of such behaviour in the 
education context.  The first  follows from the fact that any summary PM will 
inevitably be an imperfect measure of a complex process.  The incentive is therefore 
to concentrate on those parts of the process which are included in the summary 
measure, possibly to the detriment of other,  less quantifiable, tasks.  Wiggins and 
Tymms (2002) provide evidence of this ‘narrowing’ effect on the curriculum at 
primary level in the UK, Deere and Strayer (2001) show that passing rates on the tests 
included in the Texas school accountability system h ave increased relative to other 
tests, and Jacob (2002) shows how teachers responded to the test-based accountability 
system in Chicago public schools along several dimensions, one of which is 
substitution away from low-stakes subjects such as science and social studies. 
 
Second, for the same quality of education received, the better the input (the higher the 
ability of the pupils) the better the output and hence the higher the school’s relative 
position in a levels-based ranking exercise.  A PM based on raw test scores does not 
explicitly account for heterogeneity in any population of students, so the school has 
the incentive to tailor the population to improve its indicator.  There is evidence of 
schools undertaking various ‘creaming’ strategies in response to such PMs (Meyer 
1997).  Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Cullen and Reback (2002) both provide 
evidence of US schools reclassifying weak students in order that they are not eligible 
for the tests that are the subject of the indicator.  There is anecdotal evidence from the 
UK that schools are removing weak students from GCSE courses and putting them 
into GNVQ equivalents (Times Educational Supplement 2002).  Schools may 
additionally have the incentive to engage in cream skimming at the point of 
admission.  Gerwitz et al (1995), Whitty et al (1998) and West and Pennell (2000) all 
discuss ways in which a UK school can design its admissions procedure in order that 
only certain types of pupils (and parents) are attracted to the school.  These include 
the use of complicated admissions forms and pre-admission interviews.  There is also 
indirect evidence from the UK that the publication of league tables (based on raw 
output PMs) creates the incentive to exclude certain types of pupils (Gillborn (1996) 
quoted in West and Pennell (2000)).  One way to reduce the incentive for such 
behaviour is for the indicator itself to better account for such heterogeneity in the 13 
pupil population, which is one argument supporting the use of value added measures 
of school performance. 
 
Finally, different PMs give rise to specific incentives regarding how a school allocates 
its resources across any given pupil population.  As stated above, levels based PMs 
are often reported in terms of the percentage of a school’s pupils attaining a specific 
target.  Such target indicators introduce an arbitrary dichotomy into continuous data 
and will therefore focus agents’ attention on the borderline (Fitz-Gibbon and Tymms 
2002).  We may expect schools to shift their activities or target their resources to 
pupils who are expected to just miss the target in the absence of (extra) intervention.  
This may be to the detriment of pupils at either end of the ability distribution and may 
or may not be welfare improving.  Wiggins and Tymms (2002) provide evidence of 
such behaviour in UK primary schools concerned with hitting their Key Stage 2 
targets.  Deere and Strayer (2001) show that it is those pupils at or below the passing 
level that exhibit the most improvement in the tests included in the Texas 
accountability system.  While a PM based on a measure of value added should reduce 
the incentive for such dysfunctional behaviour, it should be noted that the current UK 
value added PM caps the output score at the eight best GCSE results or equivalent, 
which may c reate the incentive to distort effort away from the top end of the 
distribution (Wilson 2003). 
 
Difficulties in drawing inferences regarding gains in student performance 
 
Performance in the UK education sector – as measured by raw exam scores – has 
improved since the introduction of the quasi-market and the publication of the first 
league tables.  It is, however, difficult to isolate which element(s) of such a huge 
programme of reform has had an impact on outcomes: there is no counterfactual to the 
introduction of performance management.  Moreover, within the UK education sector, 
two types of performance measures have been introduced (summary PMs and in-
depth OFSTED reports) and it is not clear to what extent one and/or the other has 
provided educators with  the incentive to improve students’ performance.  
Consequently there is a lack of evidence on the impact of performance management in 
education.  Bradley at al (2000) provide evidence of the impact of the use of summary 
PMs in the UK.  The main findings are that: (i) new admissions are positively related 
to a school’s own exam performance and negatively related to the exam performance 
of its competitors in the same school district; (ii) the impact of the school’s 
comparative exam performance on new admissions increased after the introduction of 
quasi-market forces; (iii) schools achieve better exam results when they are in 
competition with schools with good exam performance but the impact of this is small; 
(iv) excess demand for places in popular schools has led to an increase in capacity at 
those schools; (v) greater parental choice and increased competition have led to some 
polarisation with respect to family background.  These results suggest that the 
publication of PMs (allied with implicit incentives via the quasi-market) has produced 
an improvement of outcomes, as measured by the PMs themselves.  This is 
accompanied, however, by some evidence of a selection effect. 
 
Evidence on the impact of accountability systems on student achievement in the US 
has been “limited and ambiguous” (Kane and Staiger 2002 page 106).  There have 
been test scores increases in Texas and North Carolina, two states with highly visible 
accountability systems, but Kane and Staiger suggest caution in inferring causality for 14 
three reasons.  First, other states which were also engaged in performance 
measurement did not experience such increases in test scores.  Second, at least part of 
the increase may have been due to both states’ above average exclusion rates.  Third, 
there is no evidence that the timing of improvement in performance in North Carolina 
schools coincided with the introduction of the performance measurement system.  
Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) reach a similar conclusion with regard to the introduction 
of the Dallas accountability system: Dallas test scores did rise relative to other Texas 
cities, but the timing of this improvement predated the accountability system by a 
year.  Ladd (1999) extends this analysis of the impact of the Dallas program and finds 
some evidence of it having a positive impact on student outcomes: there are positive 
and relatively large effects for white and Hispanic seventh-graders, but not for their 
black peers.  Jacob (2002) shows that test scores in maths and reading increased in 
Chicago public schools after the introduction of a test-based accountability policy, but 
that student effort and improvements in test-specific skills largely drove these 
improvements. 
 
All the above evidence discusses and attempts to estimate the impact of performance 
management on measured outcomes.  To date, these have been predominantly in the 
form of raw test scores or levels.  An improvement in such outcomes does not 
necessarily represent an improvement in actual student learning, however, particular if 
their publication creates the perverse incentives discussed above (Kane and Staiger 
2002).  Judgement of the success of performance management in education in terms 
of the government’s goals is hence particularly difficult.  Moreover, there is additional 
difficulty in trying to attribute such improvements to teachers: much of the variance in 
test scores is controlled by non-school factors, and learning is a cumulative process 
rather than one which can be attributed to the impact of one teacher at any one point 
in time (Koretz 2002).  Any inferences made about the incentives created by 
performance management must therefore be made with particular caution. 
 
Recall that what is published in UK league tables (and on US report cards) is a 
summary statistic giving a measure of the average performance of the school with 
respect to each PM.  In the 2002 UK secondary school league tables there are four 
PMs relating to GCSE exam scores, four for Key Stage 3 and two value added PMs, 
plus two improvement (or ‘change’) measures and indicators of absences, both 
authorised and unauthorised.  While publication of multiple PMs may reduce the 
incentive for a school to game the more complex performance management system 
(Ladd 1999; Fitz-Gibbon 1997), there is obviously a trade off between complexity and 
transparency: it is increasingly difficult for parents to evaluate the information 
presented to them. 
 
Two further issues are worth highlighting here.  First, different PMs provide different 
rankings of relative school performance.  Wilson (2003) shows just how sensitive a 
school’s ranking position can be to the introduction of an alternative (value added) 
PM: in one case two schools moved from 8
th and 9
th (on the percentage of pupils 
gaining at least five GCSEs at grade C or above) to 21
st and 22
nd respectively  – 
second-last and last place in their Local Education Authority’s league table.  Second, 
even if we accept that a value added PM provides a more accurate indication of the 
impact a school has on pupil progress, this is only reported at the l evel of school 
mean.  Hence it gives information on the value added by a school to its average pupil.  
The use of such an aggregated measure may, however, hide differences in the value 15 
added by the same school to pupils at different points in the ability distribution.  
Thomas (2001) and Wilson (2003) provide some evidence that there is such 
differential effectiveness across different schools.  Hence it may be particularly 
difficult for parents to draw inferences on the potential impact of a school on their 
own child’s future performance.  Inaccuracy in such inferences will have a 
detrimental impact on the ability of parents to be effective drivers for improvement in 
the education market. 
 
In summary, student outcomes as measured by raw test scores have improved since 
the introduction of performance management in both the UK and the US.  Whether 
this represents an improvement in “the quality of schooling or how much is learned 
each year” (Hanushek 2002 page 2056) is more difficult to judge, as is to what extent 
the observed gains can be attributed to specific forms of performance measure rather 
than other, often concurrent, reforms. 
 
The lessons from health care 
 
The publication of data about performance in health care is not new, nor is it confined 
to the public sector.  We focus on measures of quality and review evidence from both 
public and private health care systems, as many of the issues raised by the use of 
performance measurement are common to both. 
 
The United States has the most recent experience of publication of data on health care 
performance (Marshall et al 2000).  Information is available on the comparative 
performance of health insurance plans, hospitals and individual doctors.  Many 
different organisations have contributed to this, including federal and state 
government, employers, consumer advocate groups, the media.  Information is 
available about inputs, process measures and outcomes, though data on net outputs is 
rare.  Perhaps the best known reporting system is the Health Plan Employer Data 
Information Set (HEDIS), which is produced by a not-for-profit partnership of private 
buyers, health plans and consumers.  Information is provided at the level of plans, is 
based on both administrative and clinical data and covers both cost and quality.  
Participation is voluntary.  Other high profile systems have focused on a single aspect 
of care, that of inpatient mortality (an outcome measure).  The New York Cardiac 
Surgery Reporting system publishes data on hospital- and surgeon-specific risk 
adjusted coronary artery bypass surgery mortality.  Similar work has been undertaken 
in other states.  These data are adjusted for the type of patient treated and are derived 
from both administrative and clinical data. 
 
In comparison, there have been few examples of release of information about quality 
of care in the UK (Marshall et al 2000).  Some basic information about hospital 
performance in England and Wales has been available since the early 1980s.  This 
was intended for use by hospital managers, but the consensus is that it was little used 
because it was not widely disseminated (and was also not linked to rewards 
(sanctions) for good (bad) performance).  In Scotland, data comparing outcomes 
across both hospitals and health areas was made public from the early 1990s.  Since 
1999 there has been a large increase in the amount of publicly released data on the 
performance of English health care providers.  The National Performance Assessment 
System measures the performance on a range of financial, clinical and patient care 16 
indicators for hospitals, health care buyers and primary care providers.  For acute 
hospitals there are currently (2003) 35 indicators of performance.  These indicators 
have been released in terms of league tables for hospitals and NHS health care 
purchasers and will be released for primary care providers.  For hospitals the 35 
measures are currently amalgamated into a 4 level ‘star system’.  In the current 
amalgamation, greatest weight is given to financial and waiting list targets, and less 
weight to clinical performance and patient experience.  From 2003 performance, as 
judged by this star system, will be linked to greater financial and managerial 




Performance measurement in health occurs in almost all OECD countries.  In a 
review, Smith (2002b) argues that most nations have relied opportunistically on 
readily available data in the early stages of developing measures, but that most 
systems are now in the process of seeking out clinical outcome measures, patient 
satisfaction measures, and measures of population health in the ‘hard to measure’ 




Smith (2002a) draws attention to a number of design issues that arise in the 
construction of performance measures in health care.  The first is the need to adjust 
for sources of variation.  Variation in outcomes may occur due to differences in case 
mix (the patients being served), resources used, priorities in outcomes, the external 
environment, accounting treatment, data errors and random fluctuations.  For some 
purposes adjustment will need to be made for this variation: for example, when 
comparing morbidity from heart treatment, the clinical mix of patients needs to be 
taken into account.  In other cases such adjustment is inappropriate: for example if a 
hospital has chosen to deliver services with an inappropriate mix of staff, adjustments 
mask this source of poor performance. 
 
The second is the choice of process or outcome measures.  While there has been a 
move towards outcome measures, there are cases in which process measures are 
useful.  Smith (2002a) argues that outcomes are likely to be favoured when the nature 
of the outcome is relatively uncontested, when outcomes can relatively easily be 
captured in operational performance measures, when an indicator of the outcome can 
be secured reasonably soon after the intervention, when the outcome is readily 
attributable to clinical performance rather than external factors, and when there is a 
need for considerable clinical judgement as to the most appropriate intervention to 
offer.  This list re-iterates some of the points earlier in this paper: outcome measures 
are of use in indicating good performance when the outcomes that are desired occur in 
the short term, when risk adjustments can be made, and when there are not too many 
dimensions to the output.  Smith suggests this is more likely for acute than chronic 
treatments, as in the latter there may be no agreed consensus as to what constitutes a 
good outcome (for example, in much of primary care). 
 
                                                 
10 See http://www.doh.gov.uk/performanceratings/2002/method_acute.html for more information on 
the ‘star system’. 17 
Process and outcome measures also might have different functions.  Outcomes are 
often the result of factors outside the control of the health system.  Measuring poor 
outcomes (e.g.  inpatient mortality) does not necessarily give guidance on what to 
change in order to improve.  Such outcomes occur infrequently in comparison to the 
processes that prevent them.  On the other hand, changing a process that is known to 
improve outcomes should lead to improvements.  So measuring processes may be 
useful when performance measures are used internally to improve production, 
whereas outcome measures may be more useful when seeking to reward good 
outcomes.  Marshall et al (2000) argue that there is an increasing body of evidence 
that process measures are more sensitive and feasible measures of quality of care than 
outcome measures.  More generally, a theme that emerges in the discussion of 
performance measures in health care is the importance of the use of a range of 
measures. 
 
There is also discussion of the purpose of public disclosure of information.  Marhsall 
et al (2000) identify three models.  The first is a public accountability model in which 
disclosure is a public responsibility, independent of the consequences.  Proponents 
argue that the release of data, in conjunction with appropriate education and debate, 
will clarify important social issues.  However, this model may have little impact on 
the quality of care, though it may (for exactly the same reasons) be perceived as least 
threatening by professionals. 
 
The second is a market orientated model, in which comparative information allows 
informed consumers to drive quality improvements through choice.  To be useful, 
such data need to be standardised for differences in case-mix.  This model is possibly 
more important in health care systems in which consumers can make choices, but 
even in the US, the evidence suggests that individual consumers make relatively little 
use of performance data. 
 
The third model, a professional orientated model, assumes a desire on the part of 
professionals to improve their practice, given the appropriate environment.  Providing 
data aids this.  In this case, standardisation is not the highest priority, as providers 
may be comparing their own performance over time using the data as an aid, rather 
than a measure that is linked directly to financial rewards.  
 
Evidence on the effectiveness of performance measures 
 
Despite a decade or more of experience with public disclosure of performance data in 
the US there has been little rigorous evaluation of its impact.  Marshall et al (2000) 
identify several reasons for this.  Some of these are due to the particular nature of the 
sector, for example the ‘political incorrectness’ of challenging a tool of informed 
consumerism or the power of vested business interests.  However, they also note that 
evaluation of performance data requires a clear theoretical framework to identify the 
purpose of publication and an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
data that are being made public.  The kind of academic rigour that has been applied to 
evaluation of performance management in the training field has not yet occurred in 
health.  In part, this is due to the fact that the measurement of healthcare outcomes is 
more complex than the measurement of labour market outcomes. 
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Given this caveat, Marshall et al identify possible responses to public disclosure from 
consumers, physicians, hospitals and provider organisations, and purchasers. The 
small amount of available evidence suggests that while consumers claim to want such 
information they do not make great use of the data (Schneider and Epstein 1998). 
Physicians are interested but sceptical about the data released. A survey of the impact 
of HEDIS data on employer choice of health care plans suggests limited use by buyers 
of health care (Hibbard et al 1997). There is some evidence that provider 
organisations and hospitals are most responsive to these data. Marshall et al (2000) 
indicate some positive responses, in that report cards induced better processes or 
outcomes, particularly in competitive markets. Other responses were less positive and 
included criticisms of the data.  
 
One of the most fundamental questions is the extent to which disclosure influences the 
outcomes of care.  The most reliable evidence comes from studies of the New York 
Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (Marshall et al 2000).  Hannan et al (1994) found 
that mortality declined significantly following publication of data on mortality rates.  
Potential explanations include responses of doctors, an exodus of low volume and 
high mortality surgeons from the state, a marked improvement in the performance of 
non-low volume surgeons and improvement of surgeons new to the system.  Critics of 
the release of data argued that its publication could have reduced access to CABG 
surgery by forcing sicker patients to get surgery out of the state or by surgeons 
refusing to operate on high risk patients (potential ‘cream skimming’ strategies).  
However, this behaviour was not supported by the evidence. 
 
The recentness of published performance measures means there is little evaluation of 
the impact of such measures in the UK (as distinct from discussion).  In his review of 
international evidence, Smith (2002b) notes both that there has been a large increase 
in the amount of data collected, and that attention is increasingly turning from the 
provision of data to its interpretation, often through to risk adjustment.  However, he 
also notes that the weakest element of performance measurement systems is the 
response function, by which he means methods to ensure that management and 
clinical staff respond as intended to reported data. 
 
In summary, the lessons from the experience in the health care sector appear to be the 
following.  There are considerable technical difficulties in constructing measures of 
performance and value added (net output) measures seem very far from the current 
agenda.  Second, several commentators argue the need for different measures for 
different purposes.  It is suggested that some measures be used for internal use, others 
for external monitoring and regulation and yet others for giving information to 
consumers and other user groups.  Third, the largest response to these measures, from 
the US literature, is by health care providers (both inside and outside the private 







Performance measures are now widely used within public sector organisations, but 
there is a lack of evidence regarding their usefulness.  Hence it is still not clear to 19 
what extent performance measures help agencies achieve the goals they have been set 
by policy makers.  Several common themes emerge, however, from our review of the 
experience of performance management across the three sectors in the UK and the 
US. 
 
First, there is some consensus that gross outcomes or levels based PMs do not provide 
a sufficiently accurate picture of the relative p erformance of public sector 
organisations, and that some adjustment should be made to account for the 
heterogeneity of the input.  Such adjustment helps to (i) give a better measure of the 
impact of the agency and (ii) reduce the incentive for cream skimming.  In the JTPA 
programme and the health care sector levels based PMs have been adjusted for local 
economic conditions and risk respectively.  In education, the inclusion of prior 
attainment further improves the accuracy of the resulting value added, or net output, 
PM. 
 
Second, a single PM is not sufficient.  Public sector organisations often have multiple 
stakeholders who have differing, and sometimes conflicting, goals.  One PM cannot 
adequately address all these actors’ objectives.  Instead a range of PMs should be 
employed, both in terms of what they measure and also in terms of their form. 
 
Third, the intended purpose for each potential measure should dictate both its form 
and the decision whether to publicly disclose the resulting performance information.  
The use of PMs to improve process or performance within an organisation does not 
necessarily require the PMs to be published.  If, however, the aim is to facilitate a 
market, then publication is required.  In this case the accuracy of the information is 
essential in order that improvement in performance can be driven by effective 
competitive pressure. 
 
The lessons we have drawn from our review of the use of performance measures in 
the public sector echo the more general public administration literature, which is 
concerned less with evaluation than with implementation of measures.  For example, 
in a general discussion of effective performance measurement systems, Kravchuk and 
Schack (1996) suggest 10 design principles: 
•  Formulate a clear coherent mission 
•  Develop an explicit measurement strategy 
•  Involve key users in the design and development phase 
•  Rationalise the programme structure as a prelude to measurement 
•  Develop multiple sets of measures for multiple users 
•  Consider the customers throughout the process 
•  Provide each user with sufficient detail 
•  Periodically review and revise the measures 
•  Take account of complexities upstream, downstream and laterally 
•  Avoid excessive aggregation of information 
Kravchuk and Schack also argue that these PMs should be used as indicators, not 
tools for management, which concurs with the current emphasis on public disclosure 
of performance information. 
 
Public agencies exist precisely because there are conflicting goals amongst the 
stakeholders they represent.  It is therefore unreasonable to expect that one set of 20 
performance measures will solve the problem of governance in such bureaucracies.  
What is apparent from this review, however, is the need for more rigorous evaluation 
of the implementation of such schemes in order that their design may be improved in 
a systematic way.  There is almost no evidence on the impact of public sector 
performance management schemes on outcomes, nor on the costs of achieving these 
outcomes.  So there is almost no evidence on whether these schemes improve the 
efficiency of the public service being delivered.  On the basis of our review, we would 
make the following recommendations. 
 
First, piloting of performance management schemes should be considered more 
widely and, in particular, such pilots  should be rigorously evaluated in order to 
provide the necessary evidence on their impact.  Second, we need to better understand 
the link between process and outcome in order to ensure that monitoring of the former 
has the desired result on the latter.  Finally, there may be scope for the development of 
targets based on alternative, independent information sources such as, for example, 
the British Crime Survey to set targets for police authorities, or the use of general 
household surveys to measure the health of people living in an area.  These would be 
‘non-corruptible’ indicators of performance; they are indicators that are not subject to 
manipulation by the individuals whose actions are being measured.  Their use would 
force the relevant organisation to focus on what really mattered (for example, crime 
prevention, illness prevention) and it would also encourage them to find out what 
really mattered.  Targets could be adjusted to take account of those differences 
between areas that are outside the control of those whose performance is being 
measured and hence the impact of public service providers on outcomes could be 
better isolated and compared.  The use of such independent performance measures 
could therefore reduce the opportunity for dysfunctional behaviour, while maintaining 
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